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NOTES
RAISING THE LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE WITH
THE CLEAN WATER ACT BY UTILIZING
CITIZENS AND THE BROAD DISSEMINATION OF
INFORMATION TO ENHANCE CIVIL
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT
History shows again and again
How nature points out the folly of men.1 —
Donald Roeser
INTRODUCTION
When evaluating the effect of environmental laws, we often take
compliance for granted.2 We assume that the voice of conscience and the
potential for penalties will result in perfect compliance.3 This is not the case,
however.4 In the early 1970s, Congress recognized that past attempts at
environmental regulation had failed due partly to inadequate enforcement.5
Congress therefore included a strong enforcement framework in subsequent
environmental statutes, including the Clean Water Act (the “Act”).6
Enforcement of the Act plays an important role in the cleanup and
continued usefulness of the nation’s waterways.7 B tter enforcement requires
companies to internalize costs associated with pollution that society would
otherwise have to bear.8 Broad enforcement, thus, improves compliance with
1. BLUE OYSTER CULT, Godzilla, on SPECTRES (Columbia Records 1977).
2. See BARRY C. FIELD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 219 (1994) (“When we evaluate these
policies ex ante we often assume implicitly that the penalties written into the law will be sufficient to
produce complete compliance.”).
3. See id.
4. See id. (“[T]his in fact is never the case. Pollution control laws, like any others, require
enforcement, and this takes resources.”).
5. See Phillip M. Bender, Slowing the Net Loss of Wetlands: Citizen Suit Enforcement of Clean
Water Sec 404 Permit Violations, 27 ENVTL. L. 245, 264 (1997).
6. See infra notes 22-72 and accompanying text.
7. See Water Pollution Prevention and Control Act of 1991: Hearings on S. 1081 Before the
Subcomm. on Envtl. Protection of the Senate Comm. on Env’t and Public Works, 102d Cong. 688
(1991) (statement of John Martin, Inspector General, EPA) (“vigorous enforcement is pivotal in
promoting improved water quality”).
8. See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see also
FIELD, supra note 2, at 71 (“[A]t the end of the year the profit-and-loss statement . . . will contain no
reference whatever to . . . real downstream external costs.”).
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the Act and better achieves the Act’s goals of increasing the number of
waterways that are “fishable” and “swimmable.”9 Better enforcement of
existing regulations achieves these goals in a way that apportions the costs of
improved water quality more equitably than does the adoption of more
stringent regulations.10
In developing the enforcement framework of the Act, Congress
recognized that in order to achieve the Act’s stated goals it had to design an
enforcement system that would not be susceptible to localized political
pressures and budget constraints.11 The Federal Government, however, had
neither the budget nor the expertise to enforce the regulations on a national
level.12 Therefore, Congress developed a program whereby the states have
primary enforcement responsibility,13 with the Federal Government retaining
enforcement authority when the states fail to exercise these responsibilities.14
Because states also have bounds on their ability to enforce the regulations,
as an additional check, Congress empowered citizens to sue to enforce the
regulations.15 Citizens can thus step in and enforce the Act when there are
insufficient levels of compliance and budgetary or political pressures
constrain governmental enforcement efforts.16 In thi  way, citizens can
9. The stated goals of the Clean Water Act include making all waters fishable and swimmable
by July 1, 1983. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2) (1994).
10. See infra Part III.
11. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692, 699-700 (D.C. Cir.
1975) (discussing the inclusion of a similar enforcement framework and its implementation through
the Clean Air Act).
12. See David R. Hodas, Enforcement of Environmental Law in a Triangular Federal System:
Can Three Not Be a Crowd When Enforcement Authority Is Shared by the United States, the States,
and Their Citizens?, 54 MD. L. REV. 1552, 1571 (1995) (“[Q]uantity, variety, and geographic
dispersion of those regulated by [major environmental] laws is so great that enforcement would be
impossible if left solely to the federal government.”).
13. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994).
14. See id. § 1319(a)(3); see also id. § 1342(i) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit the authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant to section 1319 of this title.”).
15. The Act provides: “[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action . . . against any person . . .
who is alleged to be in violation of . . . an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter.” Id.
§ 1365(a).
Although there is some discussion of the dual role of the citizen, both acting as a private attorney-
general and as a private citizen enforcing rights as an individual, this Note discusses the citizen’s rights
generically. For an in-depth discussion of the dual role that the citizen plays in this enforcement
scheme, see Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental
Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of Outcome Independent
Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337 (1988); James M. Hecker, The Citizens Role in Environmental
Enforcement: Private Attorney General, Private Citizen, or Both?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Spring
1994, at 31; Jeannette L. Austin, Comment, The Rise of Citizen-Suit Enforcement in Environmental
Law: Reconciling Private and Public Attorneys, 81 NW. U. L. REV. 220 (1987).
16. See Bender, supra note 5, at 263-69.
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perform an important supplemental role in the enforcement of the Act.17
Unfortunately, however, the courts often seem hesitant to “unleash” the
people on the polluters.18 A  a result, the last tier of the enforcement
mechanism—the citizen suit—cannot help to ensure compliance with the
Act.19
Citizens are faced with a number of problems in bringing enforcement
actions. Congress can and should take action to minimize some of these
obstacles. For instance, citizen groups must spend immeasurable resources to
determine which parties are not complying with their permits. Congress
should reduce the costs that citizens incur in acquiring information by
requiring permit holders to make public reports of exceedances annually.
Having the information easily available would ease the economic burden on
the citizen bringing the suit.
Additionally, once an action is filed, these citizen groups must spend
more resources meeting the threshold requirement of standing before
reaching the merits.20 The Third Circuit has recently adopted more stringent
requirements to show standing by requiring a showing of injury to the
receiving water.21 Even if the Third Circuit’s interpretation of the citizen suit
language is correct, Congress should recognize that citizen enforcement is an
essential element of the Act and take steps to ensure its continued vitality. To
this end, Congress should clearly define that every citizen has a right to
utilize water bodies that are free from discharges in violation of an effluent
standard in any permit. Such a definition would make clear that such a
violation would be an injury in fact to any citizen that utilized that water
body and would help ensure that a greater number of citizen suits would
reach the merits.
Part I of this Note describes the enforcement framework currently in place
under the Clean Water Act, paying special attention to weaknesses in the
system that lead to nonenforcement against violators. Part II discusses
whether the violation of an effluent standard is a legal injury to the rights of
the citizen. Part III briefly analyzes which persons benefit from the
17. For a detailed discussion about some of the conflicts arising in this triangular system of
enforcement, see generally Hodas, supra note 12.
18. See Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir.
1997).
19. But see Zygmunt J.B. Plater, From the Beginning, a Fundamental Shift of Paradigms: A
Theory and Short History of Environmental Law, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 981, 1007 (1994) (“[I]f
citizens did not enforce the law, no one would.”); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 275 (2d ed. 1994) (“The citizen suit provisions are ideal instruments to enforce
any and all departures from NPDES permit conditions.”).
20. See Magnesium Elektron, 123 F.3d 111.
21. See id.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p533 note Montgomery.doc 07/27/99   11:03 AM
536 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 77:533
nonenforcement of the Act and discusses the need for stricter enforcement
prior to the enactment of a more stringent statute or more stringent
regulations. Part IV concludes the analysis and proposes a means of
enhancing civil enforcement of the Act.
I. CURRENT ENFORCEMENT FRAMEWORK OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Congress enacted the law that has become commonly known as the Clean
Water Act22 in response to numerous incidents that culminated in the
Cuyahoga River catching fire.23 In the Act, Congress included lofty goals,24 a
comprehensive permit system to meet those goals,25 and a well-defined
enforcement framework.26
The Act expressly prohibits discharges of pollutants into the waters of the
United States unless authorized by a permit.27 Any discharger of any
pollutant into a navigable water of the United States must acquire a National
Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permit.28 Th  NPDES
permit defines the receiving water and limits the amount of pollutants that the
permittee may discharge into the receiving water.29 The permittee must also
“monitor and report on its compliance with its permit.”30
22. “[T]his act may be cited as the ‘Federal Water Pollution Control Act’ (commonly referred to
as the Clean Water Act).” Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 518, 91 Stat. 1566 (codified
in scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). For consistency purposes it will be referred to as either the Clean
Water Act or the Act throughout this paper.
23. See Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
816 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1276 (1994)).
24. “The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). The stated goals include
making all waters fishable and swimmable by 1983. See id. § 1251(a)(2). It also set a national goal of
eliminating the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985. See id. § 1251(a)(1).
25. See id. §§ 1342, 1344.
26. The enforcement framework in the Clean Water Act is in many ways similar to that found in
the Clean Air Act. See RODGERS, supra note 19, at 249. One of the key similarities is the inclusion of a
citizen suit provision. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (Clean Water Act), with 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Clean
Air Act). Almost every environmental statute enacted since the Clean Air Act contains a citizen suit
provision. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (Toxic Substances Control Act); 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)
(Endangered Species Act); 30 U.S.C. § 1270 (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); 42
U.S.C. § 3006j-8 (Safe Drinking Water Act); 42 U.S.C. § 9659(a) (Comprehensive Environmental
Response Comprehension and Liability Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a) (Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act); 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1) (Emergency Planning Community Right to Know Act).
27. Section 301 of the Clean Water Act provides: “Except as in compliance with this section and
sections . . . of this title [authorizing permits], the discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be
unlawful.” 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1994).
28. Section 402 requires that a permit for the discharge of a pollutant only be issued if the
discharge meets the requirements under the Act, including any and all control requirements under
other sections. See id. § 1342(a), (b).
29. See id. § 1342.
30. Sierra Club v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 834 F.2d 1517, 1519 (9th Cir. 1987). “The Clean Water
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Companies and citizens have numerous incentives to comply with the Act
and regulations promulgated under the Act.31 Congress and commentators
recognized that, absent a threat of enforcement, altruistic incentives were not
sufficient to ensure compliance with the Act.32 Thus, Congress included an
enforcement framework similar to that found in the Clean Air Act.33
Under this enforcement framework, the states, the Federal Government
acting through the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), and citizens
all have enforcement authority.34 The states have primary enforcement
responsibility and authority.35 The EPA36 and citizens37 also have
enforcement authority that they can employ when the states fail to exercise
their enforcement responsibilities. Each of these groups performs an
important role in the enforcement of the Act.38
While citizens are somewhat more limited in their enforcement
authority,39 states with federally approved programs, as well as the EPA,
have the authority to enforce violations of any condition or limitation.40 A
“violation of any condition or limitation” includes all violations of permit
provisions, including recordkeeping and monitoring violations.41 The
enforcement authority includes the power to assess civil penalties42 or initiate
a civil judicial action.43 It also includes the ability to seek fines of up to
Act provides that each discharger holding a NPDES permit shall monitor and report on its compliance
with its permit. Each discharger must install, use, and maintain monitoring equipment and must sample
its effluents. The discharger must report the results of its self-monitoring to the EPA and the state
agency that issues the permit.” Id. at 1519 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(4)(A)).
31. See FIELD, supra note 2, at 4. These incentives include the nature of all people to comply
with the law, the moral obligation to provide a clean environment for employees and citizens, and the
economic benefits associated with a healthier work force and client base. See id.
32. Field explains that “the reason people pollute is they lack the moral and ethical strength . . .
and environmental problems are too important to wait for a long process of moral rebuilding” and that
“the economy and its institutions are set up [in a way to] lead people to make decisions that result in
environmental destruction.” Id.
33. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 143 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3730 (“In
writing the enforcement procedures involving the Federal Government the Committee drew
extensively upon the provisions of the Clean Air Act of 1970.”).
34. See infra Part I.A.
35. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (1994).
36. See id. § 1319(a)(3); see also id. § 1342(i) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit the authority of the Administrator to take action pursuant to section 1319 of this title.”).
37. See id. § 1365.
38. For a detailed discussion about the roles of each party and some of the conflicts arising in this
triangular system of enforcement, see generally Hodas, supra note 12.
39. See infra Part I.C.
40. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a).
41. Id. § 1319(a)(1).
42. See id. § 1319(g).
43. See id. § 1319(b).
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$27,500 per day for each violation44 or to bring a criminal action against a
violator.45 The Act also renders persons or entities strictly liable for
violations of any permit condition or effluent standard.46
Despite these efforts, the results Congress envisioned have not been
achieved. While rivers are no longer catching fire, at least one-third of the
surveyed waters of the United States are neither fishable nor swimmable.47
A. Analysis of the Enforcement Framework
A state can receive approval from the EPA to administer and operate the
NPDES permit program within the state.48 If a state does not have an
approved program, the Federal Government retains primary responsibility for
enforcement of the Act.49 Approval of a state program requires a showing
that, among other things, the state has sufficient power to enforce the
program.50 The existence of approved state programs has been, and remains,
a high priority of the Federal Government.51 Once the state has an approved
program under section 402, the state becomes the primary enforcement
authority having full statutory enforcement powers at its command.52 Yet,
even after primary enforcement is delegated to the state, the Federal
Government still retains a role in enforcement of the Act.53
States may choose not to enforce against an industry group, company, or
44. See id. § 1319(d). Although this section lists the penalties as $25,000 per day, Congress has
since amended all environmental penalties, increasing them to $27,500 by the inflation adjustment
rule. See Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustment Rule, 61 Fed. Reg. 69,360 (1996).
45. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c).
46. See, e.g., Stoddard v. Western Carolina Regional Sewer Authority, 784 F.2d 1200, 1208 (4th
Cir. 1986) (holding that liability under Clean Water Act is a form of strict liability).
47. See Albert S. Gore, Jr., The Clean Water Act: A Snapshot of Progress in Protecting
America’s Waters (last modified Oct. 20, 1997) <http://www.epa.gov/owowwtr1/cwa/25report.html>.
48. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b).
49. See id. § 1342(a).
50. See id.
51. See RODGERS, supra note 19, at 363.
52. See id. Rodgers points out that there were 37 approved programs by 1993. See id. at 363
n.15. This Note discusses only this majority of states. One commentator has divided the states with
approved programs into different categories, based upon their degree of enforcement and
environmental consciousness. See Hodas, supra note 12, at 1579-80. All states, however, have
common pressures and potential problems in their environmental enforcement systems. See infra notes
73-76 and accompanying text. While recognizing that some states are doing a better job of enforcing
the environmental regulations than other states, this Note discusses problems with state enforcement
generically.
53. “‘Our responsibility is not to get along with the states, it is to ensure compliance . . . . Unless
the states have a gorilla in the closet, they can’t do the job. And the Gorilla is EPA.’ Mr. Ruckelshaus
later gave voice to his frustration that the gorilla was sleeping soundly despite his best efforts to wake
it.” RODGERS, supra note 19, at 181 (quoting EPA administrator William Ruckelshaus) (internal
citations omitted).
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individual for many reasons.54 I  those situations, the Federal Government,
acting through the EPA, can step in and enforce the Act.55 In this way, the
Federal Government acts as a safety net to ensure enforcement of the Act
when localized political pressures, special interest groups, lack of
professional expertise, or budgetary constraints otherwise have resulted in
inadequate enforcement.56 Effectively, then, the Federal Government retains
full statutory enforcement authority even in states with approved programs.57
Although the Federal Government retains full statutory enforcement
authority, in states with approved programs it neither acts as, nor aspires to
become, the primary enforcement authority.58 It is vital to the system,
however, that the Federal Government, in its capacity as a secondary
enforcement authority, continues to bring a significant number of
enforcement actions.59
The Act also empowers citizens with the authority to enforce the Act.60
Citizen awareness of, and concern for, pollution issues at the local level
renders citizens more likely to discover violations of the Act.61 Thes  citizens
often are members of citizen groups, such as the Sierra Club, Public Interest
Research Group, and Natural Resource Defense Council,62 which are well-
equipped to bring suits on behalf of their members to stop violations.63
Citizens stand ready to act, individually or through these organizations, to
54. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
55. See, e.g., T.C. Brown, U.S. Tells Giant Egg Farm to Stop Polluting Creek, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), June 11, 1997, at 5B (citing alleged inaction by state as reason for EPA action); Toothless
Environmental Protection; State Inaction: Weak Enforcement Record Prompts Federal EPA
Intervention, BALTIMORE SUN, August 26, 1996, at 10A (“Maryland’s enforcement lassitude has
prompted the Environmental Protection Agency to press the state” and “in some egregious cases of
state foot-dragging . . . to issue its own citations and stiff penalties.”).
56. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
57. Before bringing an action, EPA policy requires it to consider “(1) the type of case; (2) the
timeliness and appropriateness of the state enforcement action; and (3) the adequacy of the penalty
imposed at the state level.” Hodas, supra note 12, at 1586.
58. See id. (“[E]ven if only a small number of delegated states returned their programs to EPA,
[EPA’s] enforcement program would not be able to cope with the new responsibilities. Ultimately,
there would be less enforcement not more.”).
59. See generally id. The number of actions brought by the EPA for violations of the Clean
Water Act has decreased. After averaging close to 2,000 administrative actions under the Clean Water
Act from 1989-1994, this number dropped to 1,100 for 1995-1996. EPA, FY 1996 Enforcement and
Compliance Assurance Accomplishments Report (last modified Feb. 18, 1998)
<http://es.epa.gov/oeca/96accomp/index.html>. Similar decreases are seen in administrative
compliance orders as well as administrative penalty order complaints. See id. at A-2.
60. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
61. See generally Michael S. Greve, The Private Enforcement of Environmental Law, 65 TUL. L.
REV. 339 (1990).
62. See id. at 353.
63. See id. at 351.
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alert state and federal regulating agencies to violators.64
Section 505 of the Act delegates to citizens the power to stand in the stead
of the EPA, in a position similar to private attorneys general,65 to enfo ce any
violation of an effluent standard or limitation by a permittee.66 This includes
any violation of any permit provision, including recordkeeping and
monitoring violations.67 Thus, citizens may initiate actions when the state or
federal enforcement authority knows of a violation but fails to pursue the
violator diligently.68 Also, citizens may bring claims when the state or federal
enforcement authority is unable to do so because of budgetary constraints.69
By filing notice of suits,70 citizens bring ongoing violations to the attention of
both state and federal enforcement authorities.71 Add onally, citizens may
sue the EPA to compel it to perform any nondiscretionary duty under the
Act.72
B. Limitations on State and Federal Enforcement
States face extreme pressures in the enforcement of the Act. Special
interest groups with incentives to avoid environmental controls are a
powerful force in the political arena.73 Loc lized industrial groups may be
able to exert enough pressure through campaign contributions and other
64. See id. (“[N]ationally or regionally organized environmental groups . . . account for roughly
two-thirds of enforcement actions under the [Clean Water] Act.”).
65. See Hecker, supra note 15 (noting that a citizen suing under the Act is suing on her own
behalf and that she therefore must have standing and may not invoke the standing of the government as
may a plaintiff in a qui tam action).
66. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
67. See id. § 1365(a), (f).
68. An important priority, though beyond the scope of this Note, is the general enhancement of
educational awareness of environmental issues. By teaching our children how to detect violations and
the effects of these violations, many more people are getting involved in protecting the environment in
which they live. This awareness should have positive impacts on compliance within the regulated
community.
69. See Hodas, supra note 12, at 1649-51 (discussing incidents in which state preemption of
strong cases resulted in the state pursuing some violators, while citizen groups still pursued the weaker
cases resulting in more enforcement).
70. Section 505(b) requires that prior to filing suit, the citizen must give notice to the
administrator, the state agency, and the violator. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b) (1994).
71. See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary
Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Laws, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833, 849 (1985).
This notice period allows the EPA or state agency to assess the action and possibly bring its own suit
against the polluter. See id.
72. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(2).
73. See Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in Mandating State
Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1213 (1977); see also FIELD,
supra note 2, at 223 (“[I]t’s a matter of local . . . authorities applying the law to local sources, and in
this process there can be a great deal of informal give and take.”).
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measures to avoid or inhibit enforcement of the Act.74 Additionally,
executives and regulatory agencies may essentially negate these regulations
by nonenforcement or lackadaisical enforcement as part of a “race to the
bottom” to attract businesses and jobs.75 Finally, states face limited budgets
that often cannot finance adequate enforcement.76
Many of the same forces that hinder enforcement by state governments
also act to limit the Federal Government’s enforcement power through the
EPA.77 The EPA also faces some problems that are unique to itself. The
agency is not immune to budget constraints, and attempting to administer
such a large-scale program on a national level is costly even in a secondary
role.78 The EPA lacks the staff necessary to discover all violations or to
74. See Stewart, supra note 73, at 1213. These localized political pressures could result in
environmental noncompliance “hot spots.” See id.
75. See id. at 1212.
Given the mobility of industry and commerce, any individual state or community may rationally
decline unilaterally to adopt high environmental standards that entail substantial costs for industry
and obstacles to economic development for fear that the resulting environmental gains will be
more than offset by movement of capital to other areas with lower standards.
Id.; see also Kirsten H. Engel, State Environmental Standard-Setting: Is There a “Race” and Is It “To
the Bottom”?, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 271 (1997). But see Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate
Competition: Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation,
67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1253 (1992) (suggesting that “the forces of interstate competition, far from
being conclusively undesirable, are at least presumptively beneficial”). Although environmental
pressures may not be a large enough concern to relocate existing businesses, it would be foolish to
believe that companies do not consider environmental pressures when opening new plants. State
competition for jobs has resulted in numerous incentives to companies for locating facilities in the
state. See, e.g., Donald L. Barlett & James B. Steele, Special Report/Corporate Welfare, TIME, Nov. 9,
1998, at 36. These incentives range from tax breaks to low cost land for siting of the facility. See id.
Additionally, some right to work states entice companies to build by not being sympathetic to labor
organizations. See generally H. Milward & H. Newman, State Incentive Packages and the Industrial
Location Decision, 3 ECON. DEV. Q. 203 (1995); Barry P. Warren, Assessing the Policy Implications
of State Incentives: Firm Specific Vis-a-vis Economic Growth Strategies, ECON. DEV. REV., Spring
1996, at 47; cf. Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth As Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on Domestic
Regulation, 102 YALE L.J. 2107 (1993) (same); Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and
International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039 (1993) (discussing international effect of differing
environmental regulations on global location decisions and economics); Edith Brown Weiss,
Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment, 102 YALE L.J. 2123 (1993). But cf.
Theodore M. Crone, Where Have All the Factory Jobs Gone—and Why?, BUS. REV. (FEDERAL
RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA), May/June 1997, at 3 (stating that “when environmental
regulations are mentioned in surveys of plant-location decisions, they do not rank high on the list of
concerns”).
76. See FIELD, supra note 2, at 219-20 (“Since public enforcement agencies always work under
limited budgets it is not a foregone conclusion that enough resources will ever be devoted to
enforcement to achieve acceptable levels of compliance.”). Despite these budgetary constraints, state
administrative orders have continued to climb throughout the 1990s, reaching an all-time high of 4,598
actions under the Clean Water Act for fiscal year 1996. See EPA, supra note 59. States receive limited
funding from the Federal Government to implement environmental regulations.
77. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
78. It is estimated that the United States invests $100 billion per year to control and prevent
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initiate enforcement actions against all violators of the Act.79 Additionally,
numerous political pressures bear on enforcement of the Act by the EPA.80
As a result of all of these problems, the EPA is only able to pursue a fraction
of all violators.81
In situations in which the EPA is unable to pursue a violator, there is little
that it can do to ensure state enforcement. There are currently only two tools
available to the EPA when a state fails to enforce the Clean Water Act. Other
than stepping in and enforcing the act itself,82 the EPA can only withdraw
approval of the entire state program and administer the program within the
state.83
C. Roadblocks to Effective Citizen Enforcement
Recognizing the limits of governmental enforcement capabilities,
Congress gave citizens the authority to enforce the Act.84 At the same time,
however, Congress acknowledged the potential dangers of unlimited citizen
enforcement.85 Thus, while explicitly authorizing citizen suits under section
pollution. And since 1990, the EPA has had a budget in excess of five billion dollars per year. See
EPA, Summary of EPA’s FY 1998 Presidential Budget (visited Jan. 27, 1998) <http//www.epa.gov/
ocb/budget.htm>. The 1998 budget calls for $7.6 billion to be appropriated for federal EPA programs.
See id.
79. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
80. See generally Mark Seidenfield, A Big Picture Approach to Presidential Influence on Agency
Policy-Making, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1994). But cf. David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency
Policy Making: Rethinking the Positive Theory of Political Control, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 407 (1997)
(discussing the inability of the President or Congress to exercise control over informal agency
decisions such as policy guidance).
81. As professor David Hodas points out,
Our System of public environmental enforcement is more fragile and overwhelmed than most
people realize. Annual enforcement accomplishment reports praise government’s effectiveness in
enforcing the law. But, there is less than meets the eye to claims that the law is being effectively
enforced. Despite the many enforcement success stories reported by the government, the number
of violations overwhelm the enforcement capacity of both the federal and state governments.
HODAS, supra note 12, at 1558-60 (footnotes omitted).
82. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(a)(1) (1994).
83. See id. § 1319(a)(2). It is true that Congress could add the threat of sanctions to the Act,
similar to those in the Clean Air Act, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 7509, 7616(a)-(b), but to accomplish this added
threat of sanctions, more power and flexibility would have to be given to the states in accomplishing
the goals of the Act. While it would not be uncommon for the Clean Water Act to borrow from the
Clean Air Act, see RODGERS, supra note 19, at 248, the EPA’s willingness to use sanctions has been at
best mixed. See Stephen M. Esposito, State Plans for Clean Air: Have the Section 179 Sanction
Provisions Become the Achilles Heel of the Clean Air Act?—Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
v. Browner, 57 F.3d 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1995), 15 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 241 (1996).
84. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
85. See Michael P. Healy, Still Dirty After Twenty-Five Years: Water Quality Standard
Enforcement and the Availability of Citizen Suits, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 393, 450-53 (discussing whether
availability of citizen suits will lead to inefficient level of enforcement).
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505 of the Act,86 Congress established limits on citizen enforcement.87
The Act limits citizen initiated actions in a number of ways. First, the Act
limits the remedies available to citizens to the recovery of attorney’s fees,88
civil penalties where appropriate,89 and injuctive relief.90 Next, the Act
requires citizens to send a sixty-day notice of intent to sue to the violator and
to the administrator.91 The Act also precludes citizen initiated suits for
conduct that is the subject of a civil or criminal action against the violator
being diligently prosecuted by the administrator.92 Additi nally, the Supreme
Court has determined that the Act authorizes citizen suits only when there is
a good faith allegation that the violation is continuing;93 therefore, citizens
may not initiate an action based solely on wholly past violations.94 Fina ly,
the Act only allows citizens to enforce the permit as written.95
In addition to these statutory limits, citizens also face functional obstacles
to private enforcement. Citizens bringing a suit may incur high information
costs.96 Although the Act gives the citizen the right to sue for violations, the
86. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365.
87. The Supreme Court, in Gwaltney, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 56-57
(1987), pointed out that the citizen suit provision was not to be used primarily as a penalty, but as a
method of bringing companies into compliance with their permitted effluent limitations.
88. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
89. See id. § 1365(a). In an effort to ensure that the enforcement actions were brought for
altruistic reasons, the civil penalties that are recovered under citizen suits are payable to the United
States Treasury. See id. § 1319(d).
90. See id. § 1365(a).
91. See id. § 1365(b). This not only allows the violator an opportunity to bring the facility into
compliance, it also allows the administrator an opportunity to bring an action under the Act. See Boyer
& Meidinger, supra note 71, at 849.
92. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g)(6) (reinforcing the idea that citizen suits are a supplement to
enforcement by states and the Federal Government).
93. In Gwaltney, the Supreme Court considered the language of the citizen suit provision in
depth. The Court determined that the term “alleged to be in violation” means that citizens can only
bring an action for continuing violations. Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 57. Thus, the Court concluded that
citizens have no right to sue under the Clean Water Act for wholly past violations. See id. The Court
reasoned that this limitation would effectuate the goals of the Clean Water Act. See id. This ruling is
subject to considerable comment, much of which is negative. See, e.g., Beverly McQueary Smith, The
Viability of Citizen’s Suits Under The Clean Water Act After Gwaltney of Smithfield v. Chesapeake
Bay Foundation, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1 (1989-90).
94. See Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 59.
95. For example, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1365(a), (f) do not provide for a citizen’s right to challenge a
permit. See Hodas, supra note 12, at 1578 (“Citizen enforcement does not redraft the CWA, EPA’s
CWA regulations or any NPDES Permits.”). Thus, a citizen cannot bring an action under the Act to
challenge a permit as insufficient if the permit complies with the Act. See id.; see also 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1365(a), (b).
96. See Hodas, supra note 12, at 1649. The cost of doing the investigation, preparing the notices,
and other preparations alone averaged over $2,200 for each of 19 notices filed by NDRC in an
initiative undertaken in 1986. See id.
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citizen must expend his own time and money to find the violations.97
Because the information about permit violations is not always readily
available to the citizens, some egregious offenders may be overlooked.98
Citizens also face procedural roadblocks. A great deal of time and funds
are spent battling over the issue of whether the claim brought by the citizen,
or citizen group, is justiciable under the “case or controversy” requirement in
Article III of the Constitution.99 Additionally, the citizens also must
overcome the prudential limits of standing.100 Recently, the Third Circuit has
raised the bar on standing by requiring specific evidence of injury to the
receiving water body as evidence of injury in fact to the citizen group.101 Th
97. See id.
98. Some of the monthly discharge monitoring reports are sent to agencies such as the
Departments of Health and are not reviewed by environmental agencies for information relevant to
noncompliance episodes.
99. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The constitutional
minimum of standing consists of three discrete elements. See id. The first element is injury in fact. See
id. at 560. This element requires that the party has suffered an injury as a result of the alleged
violation. See id. The injury must be concrete and particularized, actual or imminent, and not
conjectural or hypothetical. See id. Thus, a generalized grievance is not sufficient to confer standing.
See id. at 561. The second element required for standing is a causal connection. See id. at 560. The
injury must be “[f]airly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant and not . . . th[e] result
[of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Id. The third element of standing
is redressability. See id. at 561. It must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will
be redressed by a favorable judicial decision. See id.
100. In addition to the constitutional limits of standing courts impose prudential limits of standing.
See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454
U.S. 464 (1982); see also Allen v. Wright 468 U.S. 737, 750-53 (1984) (discussing the historical
background and precedence of prudential limits of standing). These prudential limitations are imposed
by the Supreme Court based upon the Court’s idea of the role of the judicial branch in a democratic
society. See Valley Forge, 454 U.S. at 474-76.
These limits include the zone of interests test, which holds that the injury must be of the type that
the statute was enacted to protect against. See, e.g., Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (holding
that Congress can and did negate prudential limitations to standing in enacting Endangered Species
Act); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (holding that the zone of interests test is a prudential limit to standing that
needs to be applied in Endangered Species Act); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org., Inc. v.
Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1969) (formulating the zone of interest test as a prudential limit of
standing). The purpose of this test is “to exclude those plaintiffs whose suits are more likely to
frustrate than to further statutory objectives.” Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388, 397
(1987).
A court should also refrain from adjudicating “abstract questions of wide public significance” that
amount to “generalized grievances.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). In so holding, the
Court explained that these types of grievances are most appropriately addressed in the legislative
branch. See id. at 499-500.
Congress can negate these prudential standing limitations, as the Court found under the
Endangered Species Act. In Bennett, the Supreme Court looked to the language of the statute
authorizing citizen suits. The provision broadly authorized “any citizen” to bring an action under the
section. The Court held that in so describing the parties who could bring an action, Congress can and
did negate the prudential limitations to standing in enacting the Endangered Species Act. See, e.g.,
Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 793 F.2d 1322 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
101. See Public Interest Research Group v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3rd Cir.
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courts seem hesitant to “unleash” the people on violators by removing any of
these limitations.102
II. VIOLATION OF EFFLUENT LIMITATION AS INJURY TO THE RIGHTS OF
CITIZENS
In order to facilitate effective enforcement of the Clean Water Act,
Congress provided an expansive definition of those who may sue under the
Act. In section 505 Congress enabled
any citizen [to] commence a civil action on his own behalf—
(1) against any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of (A) an
effluent standard or limitation under this [Act] or (B) an order issued
by the Administrator or a State with respect to such a standard or
limitation, or (2) against the Administrator [of the EPA] where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under
this [Act] which is not discretionary with the Administrator.103
Section 505(g) defines “citizen” as “a person or persons having an interest
which is or may be adversely affected.”104 An “effluent standard or limitation
under this [Act]” includes an “effluent limitation or other limitation under
1997).
102. One of the concerns voiced is a fear that aforementioned environmental action groups are
bringing the actions and not “citizens.” See Greve, supra note 61, at 353 (“[N]ationally or regionally
organized environmental groups . . . account for roughly two-thirds of enforcement actions under the
[Clean Water] Act.”). These groups, however, are better prepared to bring the actions. See id. at 354.
Additionally, the statute itself contemplates a group of citizens bringing an action. Section 505(g)
defines citizen as a person or persons having an interest that is or may be adversely affected. See 33
U.S.C. § 1365(g) (1994).
But in prevailing actions the citizen group is awarded attorney’s fees; therefore the groups
bringing these actions do not always have the altruistic purposes envisioned in the statute. See
Blomquist, supra note 15; Gwyn Goodson Timms, Note, Statutorily Awarding Attorney’s Fees in
Environmental Nuisance Suits: Jump Starting the Public Watchdog, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1733 (1992).
In other areas of law such as antitrust, where the citizen plays a role in enforcement of the regulations,
there is no requirement nor is there any pretense of an altruistic purpose. Additionally, the Clean Water
Act itself provides for the awarding of attorney’s fees. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d).
Another argument in favor of tightly reining in citizens focuses on settlement of suits with
substantial payments to community projects, environmental cleanups, environmental funds, and
environmental groups collectively referred to as Supplemental Environmental Projects. See Greve,
supra note 61, at 356-57. Settlement of suits is a reality. When there is a proposed settlement in a
citizen suit, the Department of Justice reviews the settlement to ensure that there is a penalty paid to
the United States Treasury and that any Supplemental Environmental Projects called for in the
settlement have a nexus with the violations. See NRDC v. Interstate Paper Corp., 29 Envt’l Rep. Cases
(BNA) 1135, 19 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,901 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
103. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1994).
104. Id. § 1365(g).
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section 1311 or 1312 of this Act.”105 Therefore, a violation of an effluent
standard in a NPDES permit is defined by Congress to be an offense
actionable by a citizen under the Act so long as that citizen has “an interest
which is or may be adversely affected.”106
Congress delineated the rights of private citizens so that the polluter has
the right to pollute up to the level in his permit and the citizen has a right to
have no pollutants from point sources in the water body she utilizes in excess
of the permitted levels.107 Thus, Congress recognized that a person who
utilizes a water body is or may be adversely affected by such pollution. The
violation of the effluent standard in a permit is a legal injury108 to the rights
of the citizen created by the Act and, therefore, the citizen is “adversely
affected.”109
As the Supreme Court has recognized, an injury does not have to be
substantial in order to be an injury in fact sufficient for standing. Courts have
historically not required substantial injuries in order to find standing where
the plaintiff or member of the plaintiff organization lives and recreates in the
polluted area.110 As the Court noted in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures,111 a mere trifle injury will suffice. In Sierra
Club v. Morton,112 the Court recognized that smoke obscuring an otherwise
pristine view is a sufficient injury to support standing. The Court declared
that to live in the area which will be affected by the pollution is a sufficient
injury to establish standing.113 Various lower courts have followed this
rationale in holding that injuries to aesthetic, conservational, recreational, and
economic interests can be sufficient to support standing.114
105. Id. § 1365(f).
106. Id. § 1365(g); see also Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Powell-Duffryn Terminals,
Inc., 913 F.2d 64, 70 & n.3 (3d Cir. 1990).
107. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994).
108. A “legal injury is by definition no more than the violation of a legal right; and legal rights
can be created by the legislature.” Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of
the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK L. REV. 881, 885 (1983); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Standing
and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1476 (1988).
109. See Scalia, supra note 108, at 887.
110. See, e.g., NRDC v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 2 F.3d 493, 504-05 (3d Cir. 1993); NRDC v.
Watkins, 954 F.2d 974, 978-81 (4th Cir. 1992); Powell-Duffryn Terminals, Inc., 913 F.2d at 70-73.
111. 412 U.S. 669, 690 n.14 (1973).
112. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
113. See id. at 734.
114. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. SCM Corp., 580 F. Supp. 862 (W.D.N.Y. 1984). In Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992), however, the Supreme Court appeared to limit the injury
in fact doctrine. This case does not apply to citizen suits for violations of the Clean Water Act. In
Lujan the Court addressed whether Congress had the power to allow citizens to challenge the
observance of the laws and the Constitution by executive branch agencies. See id. at 576. The question
addressed was “whether the public interest in proper administration of the laws . . . can be converted
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Congress has created in citizens a legal right to have water bodies that
they utilize be free from discharges in violation of an effluent standard115 and
has authorized citizens to sue to enforce that right.116 Any unpermitted
discharges from a point source, or discharges in excess of permitted levels,
into water bodies utilized by the citizen violate that citizen’s legal right.
Thus, the citizen has suffered an injury in fact.117
In addition to better approximating the congressional goal of expansive
enforcement, courts should facilitate the establishment of standing for other
reasons.118 Congress recognized that courts do not have the expertise to
determine injury to water bodies.119 Therefore, Congress delegated to the
executive branch the power to determine the proper levels of pollutants
allowable in each water body.120 Utilizing this authority, either the EPA or
approved state agency has determined by regulatory action the level of a
pollutant that each company is allowed to discharge into a body of water.121
Any pollution above this level will or may have an adverse effect on the
rights of the citizen that uses the water body.122 Once it is recognized that
nonpermitted pollution “may adversely affect” the citizen, and that this
adverse effect is an injury sufficient for standing, the issue of whether the
plaintiff suffered an injury in fact should be considered settled.123 If the
into an individual right by a statute that denominates it as such, and that permits all citizens . . . to
sue.” Id. at 576-77. The Court stated that to allow Congress to do so would violate separation of
powers by transferring powers from the executive to the judicial branch. See id. at 577. The Court then
clarified: “Nothing in this contradicts the principle that ‘[t]he injury required by Art. III may exist
solely by virtue of statutes creating legal rights the invasion of which creates standing.’” Id. at 578
(citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)). The violation of these rights does not have to rise
to the level of a legal injury at common law, but it does have to be a concrete, de facto injury. S e id. t
578.
115. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1994).
116. See id. § 1365.
117. See Scalia, supra note 108, at 885.
118. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Causation in Government Regulation and Toxic Torts, 76 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1307, 1332-35 (1998).
119. See id. at 1328 (“Congress used considerable care in drafting the citizen suit provision of [the
Act] in a way that would keep courts from having to become enmeshed in difficult scientific and
policy disputes.”).
120. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994).
121. The EPA or state agency is required to determine what the appropriate level of pollution
allowed to enter a stream should be in determining the permit levels. See id.
122. See DuBoise v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996); Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v.
Cedar Point Oil Co. 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996). But see Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v.
Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (1997). If the plaintiff is an environmental action group, they
will still have to show that the group meets the three criteria necessary for organizational standing. See
supra note 99.
123. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745 (“An alleged violation
of an effluent control limitation or standard would not require reanalysis of technological [or] other
considerations at the enforcement stage. These matters will have been settled in the administrative
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courts were to decide the injury issue, they would be stepping into the
province of the executive branch and would create a separation of powers
issue.124
This is not to say that the effect of the pollution on the water body is not
important. The Act requires that the EPA consider the effect of the pollution
on the water body in determining the appropriate fine.125 Courts, although not
bound by statute, also utilize this factor in determining the amount of fines
under the Act. Experts should be called on to discuss the extent of
environmental damage only in the determination of the fine and not in the
standing inquiry.126
The courts have not treated the violation of an effluent standard by a
permittee into the environs in which a citizen lives or recreates uniformly.127
This differing treatment has resulted from confusion over what rights the Act
created in the citizen.128 Some courts look for an injury to the water body as a
surrogate for determining whether the citizen suffers injury. These courts
have failed to recognize that they need only look at the rights the citizen has
under the Act and whether those rights have been violated.
In Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co.,129 a citizen
group initiated a suit after it discovered that a company was violating the
Clean Water Act by discharging produced water without a permit. The
company argued that the citizen group did not have standing because it had
not shown any injury resulting from the violation of the effluent standard
because no detrimental effect on the receiving water had been shown.130 The
Fifth Circuit rejected this argument stating that an interest in the water body
is sufficient to establish standing without necessarily observing pollution
impacts.131 The court assumed that the citizen has unlimited rights in the
procedure leading to the establishment of such effluent control provision.”).
124. See Pierce, supra note 118, at 1336.
125. The EPA or state agency, in determining the permit levels, determines the appropriate level
of pollution allowed to enter a stream. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994). Thus, it is an injury to citizens
using the water body to allow pollution in excess of these levels. The remaining question is the extent
of the fine, which incorporates environmental damage. In section 309, the statute lists a number of
criteria to be considered in determining the appropriate amount of the fine. See id. § 1319(d).
126. Cf. Duboise v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996).
127. Compare Sierra Club, Lone Star Chapter v. Cedar Point Oil Co., 73 F.3d 546 (5th Cir. 1996),
with Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
128. Subsequent cases to consider this issue have only further clouded the issue by trying to
distinguish the cases while still not recognizing that injury to the creek is a poor surrogate for injury to
the citizen under the Act. Injury to the creek, while relevant, does not always neatly track injury to the
citizen.
129. 73 F.3d 546, 550 (5th Cir. 1996).
130. See id. at 555.
131. See id. The First Circuit followed this holding in DuBoise v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir.
1996). The First Circuit held that someone who hiked near, and drank water from, a pond that was
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water body and that any action that could threaten injury to the water body is
injury sufficient to create standing in the citizen.132
In Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Magnesium Elektron, Inc.,133
the Third Circuit faced a similar issue. Magnesium Elektron used expert
testimony to show that the violation did not cause any adverse effects on the
receiving body of water.134 The court accepted this information as accurate
and held that with no adverse effects shown on the receiving body of water,
the citizen group could show no adverse effects to them and thus there was
no injury in fact.135 The court found, therefore, that the Public Interest
Research Group lacked standing to bring the suit.136 In so holding, the court
assumed that the citizen only has a right to have the water not suffer
immediately deleterious effects as a result of the unpermitted effluent.137
The discharge of a pollutant in an amount exceeding the limit in an
NPDES permit into a body of water utilized by a citizen is a violation of the
citizen’s legal rights and thus an injury in fact sufficient for standing.138
Congress determined that any pollutants discharged into the waters of the
United States are deleterious and therefore sought to eliminate all discharges
of pollutants into these waters in the Act.139 While the statute allows for
discharge of pollutants in accordance with an NPDES permit,140 allowing
such a discharge is not recognition that some pollution is good for a water
receiving unpermitted discharges had an injury sufficient for standing without any other showing. See
id. at 1282-83. The court noted that a person utilizing a stream for recreation may be less likely to use
the stream due to known pollution in the stream. See id. at 1283. Additionally, with the concerns about
bioaccumulation of toxins in fish, fishermen are less likely to be able to enjoy their catch for dinner.
As long as the fear is not an irrational one, a fear that limits an individual’s enjoyment of a polluted
water body is an injury as defined by the Court. See Sierra Club, 73 F.3d at 555 (suggesting that
interest in water body is sufficient to establish standing without necessarily observing impacts of
pollution on individual seeking standing.)
132. See id.
133. 123 F.3d 111 (3d Cir. 1997).
134. See id. at 116.
135. See id. at 119-20.
136. See id at 123.
137. See id. at 120. But see id. at 124 n.9 (stating, in dictum, that foregoing eating fish from
waterbody because of reasonable fear that fish is toxic due to effluent of company may be sufficient
injury for standing).
138. See supra notes 127-32 and accompanying text. But see Magnesium Elektron, Inc., 123 F.3d
111.
139. “The objective of the Clean Water Act is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1994). The stated goals included
making all waters fishable and swimmable by 1983. See id. § 1251(a)(2). The Act also required
dischargers to stop all discharge of pollutants from entering navigable waters [of the United States] by
1985. See id. § 1251(a)(1).
140. Section 402 of the Clean Water Act provides that no one is authorized to discharge pollutants
to waters of the United States without a permit. See id. § 1342.
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body.141 It is a license to pollute, allowing only limited pollution by permitted
companies and individuals.142 In the long term, however, the Act was
designed to eliminate pollution.143
Although all pollution to a water body is or may be injurious to that water
body, Congress delineated the rights to the water body and only authorized
citizens to sue for those discharges in excess of effluent limitations.144 As
such, the Act does not codify a “common law” of water quality,145 nor does it
define the citizen’s rights in the receiving water as unlimited. It provides that
the citizen has the right to be free from unpermitted discharges from point
sources, or discharges in excess of permitted levels, into water bodies utilized
by the citizen. For a court to hold that there is no injury because the pollution
did not have an immediate, noticeable effect would be a reversion to the
“dilution is the solution to pollution” theory which was rejected in the
enactment of the Act.146
III. UTILIZING ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF
FISHABLE AND SWIMMABLE WATERS IN THE UNITED STATES
There have been significant inroads into the water pollution problem
using the Act’s regulatory and enforcement scheme.147 Riv rs no longer
catch fire, and the number of fishable and swimmable streams in the United
States has doubled.148 The progress, however, has not been sufficient to meet
the goals of the Act.149 The Act has yet to bring greater than one-third of the
waters of the United States into compliance with the easiest of the goals,
141. See id.
142. See generally id.
143. See id. § 1251(a)(1).
144. See id. § 1365(a).
145. See S. REP. NO. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3745 (stating that citizen suit
provision would not rely on common-law definition of water quality).
146. “Dilution is the solution to pollution” is an adage that allows companies to externalize their
costs by not accounting for pollution to the environment. The system as envisioned by Congress would
have required companies to internalize these costs by treating their wastewater to drinking water
quality or switching to zero discharge systems. Congress recognized that this was not an adequate
means of treating the pollution problem.
147. See Clean Water Act; Vice President’s Initiatives, 62 Fed. Reg. 60,448 (1997).
148. See id.
149. The goal of eliminating discharges of pollutants into the waters of the United States is not
close to being accomplished. Far from being a discharge elimination system, the permit program more
closely resembles a license-to-pollute system. See Marshall J. Breger et al., Providing Economic
Incentives in Environmental Regulation, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 463, 470 (1991) (speeches before the
Administrative Conference of the United States). “[M]ost people who are at least somewhat familiar
with the issue see that regulation is a license to pollute, and a license to pollute for free.” Id.
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making all waters fishable and swimmable.150
The need for more stringent regulations seems to follow from this
statement.151 One report, however, states that twenty percent of permittees
are in significant noncompliance as defined by the EPA.152 Thus, before
requiring more stringent regulations, one should focus on the enforcement of
regulations as they currently exist as a primary means of reducing pollution
from point sources.
Enforcement of the Act against violators would require those companies
and individuals to internalize the costs of clean water. The companies and
individuals that continue to shirk their responsibilities under the Act and that
continue to treat environmental costs as externalities are the clear
beneficiaries of the nonenforcement of the Act. By failing to comply with the
Act, they gain an economic advantage over their competition because they do
not internalize any of the costs of clean water.153 The costs of these violations
and nonenforcement are spread to all citizens, through polluted waterways,
increased health risks, and other social costs of pollution.154
If the regulations are made more stringent for point source polluters, there
will be winners and losers within the regulated community.155 The w nners
will be those companies who are currently violating the Act. If they continue
to violate, they will enjoy an even greater competitive advantage.156
The losers will be those in the regulated community who choose to
continue complying with their permits. They will face increasing costs of
compliance putting them at an even more distinct competitive
disadvantage.157 By obeying the law and internalizing some of the
150. The stated goals included making all waters fishable and swimmable by 1983. See 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2) (1994). Reports vary as to the exact percent of streams that are still not meeting the goal
of fishability or swimmability. Compare Gore, supra note 47 (stating that 33 percent of the surveyed
waters of the United States are not fishable or wimmable), with Dirty Water Scoundrels: Clean Water
Act: Progress & Unfulfilled Promise (last modified Mar. 25, 1997) <http/www.pirg.org/pirg/enviro/
water/dws97/cwa.htm> [hereinafter Dirty Water Scoundrels] (stating that “40 percent of our rivers,
lakes, and estuaries are still too polluted for safe fishing or swimming”).
151. A significant amount of the nation’s water pollution problem does result from nonpoint
sources. More significant enforcement effort on point sources alone is not the answer. I deed, while
improvements in water quality may be made by the proposal contained in this Note, it is also necessary
and expected for widespread water quality improvements to control nonpoint source water pollution as
recognized in proposed House Bill 1453 and proposed Senate Bill 645. Clean Water Enforcement and
Compliance Improvement Act of 1997, H.R. 1453, 105th Cong. (1997); S. 645, 105th Cong. (1997).
152. See Dirty Water Scoundrels, supra note 150.
153. See FIELD, supra note 2, at 71 (“[A]t the end of the year the profit-and-loss statement . . . will
contain no reference whatever to . . . real downstream external costs.”).
154. See id.
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See id.
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environmental costs of doing business, they will face increasing costs of even
more stringent regulations. These increased costs would equate to a penalty
for compliance.158
If Congress instead emphasizes enforcement of the Act as it exists, those
in the regulated community who have not yet internalized the environmental
costs will be forced to do so.159 This would diminish the competitive
advantage of noncompliance resulting in a more level playing field.160
IV. PROPOSALS FOR ENHANCING CIVIL ENFORCEMENT OF THE CLEAN
WATER ACT
One method of enhancing enforcement is increasing the number of
inspectors and enforcement personnel, as well as increasing the amount of
time spent inspecting at both the state and federal level.161 This is an
expensive solution, however. There are other ways that compliance can be
enhanced without drastically increasing governmental costs. Lifting barriers
to citizen initiated suits is one such way.
A. Utilize Informational Avenues to Raise Awareness
Broad dissemination of information can enhance enforcement of the Act
and aid in bringing companies into compliance. Television, newspapers,
magazines, and the Internet are major influences in the lives of citizens.162
The Act should use these media tools to bring problems to the attention of
concerned constituents; this may prod both the agencies and citizens into
158. See id. at 81 (“[W]hat we want to do is end up with efficient levels of environmental quality
that are equitably distributed.”). One important aspect of environmental policy is its fairness. See id. at
181.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 71.
161. See Hodas, supra note 12, at 1579 n.133 (“EPA inspectors do little inspection; more than
three-fourths of the inspectors spend less than 20% of their time inspecting.”).
162. See, e.g., G. Ray Funkhouser, An Exploratory Study in the Dynamics of Public Opinion, PUB.
OPINION Q., Spring 1973, 62-75 (explaining that because the news media are believed by many
people, including policymakers, to be reliable sources of information, the news media often results in
policy responses that are incorrect.); Diana C. Mutz & Joe Soss, Reading Public Opinion, PUB.
OPINION Q., Fall 1997, 431-51 (showing how the media presentation of public opinion, while possibly
not being very effective at changing personal opinion, can affect the perception of the importance of
the issues and the direction the public heads). This has been used by the media to change perception of
some environmental issues. See, e.g., Science Meets the Press: Can the Media be Trusted?: Quest for
Better Gatekeeping in Covering Complex Issues, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1994, at M4. This ability is
sometimes used irresponsibly in an attempt to change public opinion. See id.; George Will, Earth
Day’s Hidden Agenda, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 1990, at A27 (describing a week of environmental
concern as “the media all jump[ing] feet first, on cue, into the coordinated manipulation of public
opinion”).
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action.163 Once the public is aware of pollution issues, people and agencies,
as well as the violators themselves, are much more likely to take the steps
necessary to correct the violations.164
In addition to the monthly reports that are required under the Act,
companies should be required to summarize these reports annually and send
the summary to the EPA.165 This summary should contain all of the
information that has been provided during the year, including the number of
days that the discharge exceeded the permit levels and how many excess
pounds of pollutants and toxics were released to the receiving water as a
result.166
This can be accomplished by amending Section 308(a)(4)(A)(ii) to read
as follows:
(ii) make such reports, including an annual summary of the number of
days that the permittee has exceeded the permit levels of any pollutant
and the excess pollution resulting from said exceedances, to the
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.
This information can then be provided to the general public through press
releases, the federal register, or the Internet.167 This measure, in combination
with the following, will help ensure that citizen enforcement is utilized to
bring violators into compliance.
B. Define Violation of an Affluent Standard into the Environs in Which a
Citizen Lives or Recreates as Injury in Fact
This Note has discussed the violation of an effluent standard into the
163. See Americans Unaware of Environmental Threat from Loss of Biodiversity, U.S.
NEWSWIRE, July 20, 1993 (explaining that once the importance of biodiversity was explained to the
public, an overwhelming majority were in favor of taking steps to conserve biodiversity).
164. See id.
165. Many of the monthly Discharge Monitoring Reports are currently being generated by lower
level employees and are never seen by upper management. Some are sent to agencies such as
departments of health and are not reviewed by environmental agencies for information relevant to
noncompliance episodes.
166. This is not meant to imply that all episodes of exceedance are permit violations. There are
upset provisions and other exemption provisions within the Clean Water Act and permits that may be
applicable to the episode. The information being provided, however, would highlight possible
compliance problems.
167. Alternatively, the Environmental Protection Agency and other agencies receiving the
monthly Discharge Monitoring Reports could summarize the data from these reports. The EPA could
then compile this information and release the information to the public annually. In any event, the
information would need to be localized to be relevant. One method would be to organize the pollutant
information by county and receiving water.
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environs where a citizen lives or recreates as injury in fact.168 Yet cour s do
not always agree with this assertion.169 Congress can and should clarify this
point by defining the legal rights of the citizen and what actions would
violate that right. Congress has the authority to define injuries where none
before existed.170 As Justice Kennedy stated in Lujan v. Defenders of
Wildlife:
In my view, Congress has the power to define injuries and articulate
chains of causation that will give rise to a case or controversy where
none existed before, and I do not read the Court's opinion to suggest a
contrary view. In exercising this power, however, Congress must at
the very least identify the injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the
injury to the class of persons entitled to bring suit.171
The Act is an opportunity to incorporate such a definition. By adding the
following language to Section 505 of the Clean Water Act,172 Congress can
clarify that such a violation is an injury.
505(j): Any Discharge in violation of any effluent standard in any
permit under section 402 or 404 or any Discharge of any pollutant
without a valid permit as required under section 402 or 404, to a water
body is an injury in fact (sufficient to support standing) to any citizen
who lives or recreates within the environs of said water body.
Adoption of this language would clarify the legal rights of the citizen,
define violation of an effluent limitation as an injury Congress “seeks to
vindicate,” and “relate the injury” to all persons who live or recreate in the
environs in which the violation is occurring. Congress would thereby help to
eliminate a procedural roadblock in the citizen enforcement arena.173 L ss
time and resources would be devoted to proving a procedural element,
thereby allowing courts to focus on the merits of citizen-initiated cases.
In doing so, Congress would not be “conferring standing” on a group of
168. See supra Part II.
169. See supra notes 127-46 and accompanying text.
170. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
171. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
172. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1994).
173. Standing is often a hotly contested issue in environmental citizen suits. See Roger Beers,
Standing and Rights of Action in Environmental Litigation, ALI-ABA, June 24, 1996, at 1. In the
alternative, Congress could add the following language: “Each citizen has the legal right to have all the
water bodies utilized by said citizen free from unpermitted discharges or discharges in excess of
permitted levels from a point source.” This would clarify what a citizen’s legal rights are and what
type of action would violate those rights.
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citizens. Congress would simply be clarifying what right the citizen has and
what actions would violate that right so as to injure the citizen.
CONCLUSION
The enforcement scheme in the Act is designed as a system to ensure
vigilance in environmental enforcement. Nevertheless, there are still cracks
in the system that allow some violators to escape enforcement. Before
making regulations more stringent and penalizing those in the regulated
community who are complying with the Act, the Act should be enforced as it
now exists, thereby bringing those in the regulated community up to the
current standards. Better enforcement would result in benefits to the
community without widening the competitive advantage of those who refuse
to internalize environmental costs. Along with increasing enforcement
personnel, this enhanced enforcement can be accomplished in other ways
without greatly increasing costs to the regulating community. Congress
should therefore amend the Act to require permittees to submit an annual
summary of their discharges and define violation of an effluent standard as
injury in fact.
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